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How does relative deprivation cause people to condone political violence? 
This thesis investigates this question by utilizing survey data conducted in 
Bangladesh. Scarcity of public resources, lethal political confrontation and poor 
resource allocation make Bangladesh a fertile ground for violence. Although the 
survey suggests a relationship exists between relative deprivation and the public 
attitude toward condoning political violence, the regression analysis reveals that the 
relationship is imprecise. Small sample size, lack of technical capacity, and limited 
applicability of the foundational theory may have caused this imprecise outcome. The 
study concludes by providing recommendations for future research to undertake a 
mixed method for this sensitive topic. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Political violence is a harsh reality for many countries in the developing world. 
However, within academia it is possible to investigate the many varieties of political violence 
to help mitigate this challenge. This thesis will explore how relative deprivation causes 
people to condone political violence. It focuses on a specific case country, namely 
Bangladesh, which is selected through a scientific approach. This chapter provides a 
comprehensive overview of the research question: how does relative deprivation cause people 
to support or condone political violence?  
Modernization theorists Lipset (1963), Rostow (1960), Apter (1967), and others in the 
1960s have suggested that if countries of the developing world follow the path of 
development through industrialization they would be able to institutionalize democracy, civil, 
and human rights. The theory of modernization has capitalized on evidence drawn from 
industrialized democracies in Europe. As part of democratic development, western nations 
gain strong control over political violence. However, the modernization theory has faced 
criticism because when developing nations industrialize, instead of making progress, as 
Collier and Rohner (2008) point out, "the below… income threshold democracy increases 
proneness to political violence" (p.531). Recent studies in the field of political violence have 
contributed in many ways to the understanding of why political violence prevails in the 
Global South. Some studies have suggested that ideological differences among contending 
political groups as well as deep ethnic divisions encourage the political system to resort to 
violence (Bohara, Mitchell, & Nepal, 2006; Wilkinson, 2004). However, the vast majority of 
the literature investigates different approaches to political violence, such as how incumbents 
use violence to influence voters' attitude, how perceived insecurity makes people vote for a 
violent leader, and identifying the trends and patterns of political violence that leaders usually 
follow (Onapajo, 2014; Höglund, 2009; Suykens & Islam, 2015).  
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Most of the existing debate only deals with the leadership perspective of political 
violence. Although the citizen approach has branched out from the broader domain of the 
leadership approach, scholarly contributions to the citizen approach are limited. This study 
focuses on understanding the citizenry approach of political violence, specifically, how does 
relative deprivation cause people to condone political violence? The research leverages the 
idea of resource scarcity and the gap between “legitimate expectation and actuality” (Gurr T., 
1968, p. 253), which suggests that frustration pits people against the political system. When 
voters place their demand (inputs) into the political system (processing unit) but receive no 
results (outcomes), combined with watching other voters' demands being met with rewards, 
deprived voters develop vindictive sentiments, eventually leading to condoning violence 
committed against the reward-winner. In brief, when an individual feels relatively deprived 
based on political preference, that individual will condone political violence. Average 
citizens often find themselves relatively deprived based on their political ideologies in a 
number of ways for instance, access to public health care facilities. 
The gap between legitimate expectation and reality makes people become frustrated, 
eventually developing a condoning attitude toward violence. Often it is challenging to 
calculate the expectation gap and attitudes toward condoning violence. Numerous 
contributions to the literature suggest different parameters to measure deprivation, including 
housing, food, transportation, communication, healthcare, and education (McKay & Collard, 
2003; Gordon, 1995; Walker & Pettigrew, 2011). However, it is comparatively challenging to 
determine public sentiment toward condoning violence. In general, violence is considered as 
an unacceptable social event which people don't want to support publically (Lobbestael, 
2015). To deal with the challenges of finding out the latent attitudes of condoning violence, 
the vignette method is often implemented through experimental survey (Atzmülle & Steiner, 
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2009). Thus for empirical evidence, this study will base its data on a secondary source to 
study the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence (Haque, 2019).  
Rather than limit its scope within a region, this study follows a scientific method to 
determine its optimal case study. As developed democracies limit tolerance for violence and 
authoritarian regimes offer limited empirical evidence, this study seeks to focus on a list of 
developing countries where violence is prevalent. Here Bangladesh is shortlisted based on the 
Economist's democracy index and availability of technical resources (Economist, 2018).  
This study attempts to provide insight into the citizenry approach of political violence. 
The existing literature in the field of political violence is predominantly leadership-oriented. 
The leadership approach deals with how leaders use political violence as a tool to protect and 
protract power. The process to protect and protract power consists of numerous methods, for 
example: depriving one group compared to others, boosting ethnic division, public resource 
allocation and promoting religious factions. The vicissitudes of the leadership approach of 
political violence make it clear that new research should move forward with a different 
approach which can contribute to diminishing the knowledge gap. This research attempts to 
present the foundation in one of the under-researched approaches to analyzing political 
violence which will help advance the study of violence and paint a comprehensive picture of 
this mechanism. Although there are enormous challenges in analyzing the citizenry approach 
of violence, this study attempts to establish the basic foundation for that approach. The 
findings of this study illustrate how relative deprivation causes people to condone political 
violence. The outcomes of the study could help policymakers address deprivation issues that 
trigger mass condoning of political violence. 
The basic premise of this study relies on survey data derived from a secondary source; 
as a result, the statistical significance of the data will largely influence the overall conclusion 
of this study. There are two major parts of the dataset: independent variables and dependent 
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variables. The survey maker has placed the independent variables at the forefront of the 
survey and the dependent variables at the end. 
Basically, the survey maker has drawn the deprivation indicators from the violence 
literature of western writers like McKay and Collard (2003), Walker and Pettigrew (2011), 
and Gordon (1995). The indicators used by those scholars are primarily targeted to 
understanding the deprivation status in developed countries. As a result those borrowed 
deprivation indicators can fall short of determining the deprivation status of a developing 
country like Bangladesh. For example, the survey contains a deprivation question related to 
accommodation: how many people do you share a bedroom with? For a developed country, 
sharing bedroom with more than three people is rare, while it is common in Bangladesh. As a 
result, any question related to accommodation can overwhelmingly produce the same high 
score for the majority respondents.  
However, the dependent variables are established to identify the extent to which the 
respondents condone political violence. The challenge here is to determine how credible and 
open the respondents are. Lobbestael (2015) argues that people do not want to expose 
themselves to danger even if they support political violence. Additionally, conducting a 
survey through a vignette questionnaire requires expert interviewers who can present a 
convincing scenario for the respondents. Thus, the actual representation is crucial while 
subtle insincerity can distort the outcomes. 
Moreover, the survey maker followed a random sampling method to reach 
respondents from diverse backgrounds in an attempt to ensure that the sample can represent 
the actual demography of Bangladesh, despite its small N size of only 156 observations. 
Hence it is cautioned that the sample size of the study may not be random enough. The small 
sample size hints at additional dimensions required to fully conceptualize the relationship 
between relative deprivation and political violence. 
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This chapter presents the basic foundation of this study along with its scope and 
limitations. This study seeks to answer the following question: how does relative deprivation 
push people to support or condone political violence? To investigate the question this study 
uses quantitative survey data which is designed to calculate levels of deprivation and the 
tendency to condone violence. The findings are expected to bring deeper nuance to the 
citizenry approach of violence. This study will also expose the relationship between relative 
deprivation and political violence.  
The following section reviews the literature on this subject and is followed by a 
theory and hypothesis discussion. This research concludes with a methodological discussion 




CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section seeks to determine the factors that cause people to condone political 
violence in a democracy. Given that a consolidated democracy intentionally rejects the 
adoption of violence, this research identifies what makes a citizen of an unconsolidated 
democracy to condone political violence. Democracy scholars have argued that contending 
ideology, political polarization and the tendency to protract and protect power influence 
leaders of developing nations to pursue violent tactics. Violent events can be used as a tool 
during an electoral year, but periodic use of violence to control resource distribution also may 
be a factor. Social psychologists have argued that long term exposure to violence encourages 
greater support for violence in a population. Additionally, the gap between legitimate 
expectation and reality may elicit greater support for violence.  
The debate over democracy 
The simplest way to define democracy is a system of government ruled by the people 
(V-Dem, 2015, p. 9). However, these few words leave plenty of room for the addition of 
more illustrative and normative descriptions, which has led to the ongoing debate over 
defining democracy. Schmitter and Karl (1991) have argued that as democracy is “not a 
single set of institutions,” it is, “contingent upon a country's socioeconomic conditions as 
well as its entrenched state structures and policy practices” (p.76).  In defining democracy 
based on the scope of government, two different schools of thought have emerged: the thick 
and thin concept. The “thin” conception of democracy consists of “procedural arrangements” 
while the “thick” conception emphasizes a “morally infused substantive account” (Allan, 
2006, p. 534). Although it is important understand the application of both the thick and thin 
concepts when analyzing a democracy, some scholars emphasize one over the other. For 
instance, V-Dem (2015) has presented six different concepts to explain the significant varities 
of democracy such as: (i) liberal principle to protect individual rights, (ii) majoritarian 
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principle to the will of the sovereign majority, (iii) consensual principle to include maximum 
possible perspective, (iv) participatory principle to participate in political process (v) 
deliberative principle to make informed decision for the public, and (vi) eagalitarian principle 
to establish political equality for all (pp. 23-26). Advocating the opposite, however, Allan 
(2006) has predominantly rejected the significance of the thick concept. The author evaluates 
the case of Zimbabwe where the voting process is hindered by fraud and corruption. Thus in 
this case the thin concept of democracy would simply conclude that Zimbabwe is not a 
democracy while the thick concept establishes, with greater nuance, that Zimbabwe is not 
democratic because the voters‟ preference has been ignored (Allan, 2006).  
 The debate over democracy remains incomplete without addressing 
democratic consolidation. According to Schedler democratic consolidation is a continuous 
process which includes but is not limited to upholding democratic values, neutralization of 
anti-system actors, and routinization of politics (Schedler, 1998, pp. 91-92). However, with a 
very specific view, Robert Dahl has argued that democratic consolidation refers to a fair, 
competitive, and inclusive election with civil and political rights (Dahl, 1971). David Collier 
(as cited in Power & Powers, 1988) contends that there are three approaches to defining 
democratic consolidation: (i) the actor-oriented approach deals with the willingness of 
political actors to operate within the democratic rules, (ii) the event-oriented approach 
focuses on whether political events fall within constitutional limits, and (iii) the institution-
oriented approach evaluates institutionalization and meaningful changes. Consolidation of 
democracy is an unfinished process that begins with a transition to democracy and depends 
on the success of sustaining the transition. According to Beetham (1994) maintaining the 
consolidation process is much more difficult and extensive than the transition itself and as a 
result, “not all who make the transition will be able to sustain it” (pp. 159-160). However, 
some scholars pose contradictory views to Dhal‟s conception of democracy, contending that 
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regular elections and the fair transition of power with political rights alone cannot fully 
portray consolidation (Beetham, 1994). There are some criteria present in the democracy 
literature which are univerally used to define whether a democracy is consolidated or non-
consolidated, such as: (a) freedom of association and communication, (b) free and inclusive 
electoral contestation, (c) constitutionalism and rule of law, (d) state adherence to legal 
national bureaucratic principles and (e) economic growth and respect for property rights 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996). Any nations whose governance mechanisms fall under these criteria 
are considered consolidated democracies and otherwise are identified as non-consolidated.  
How does democracy differ in terms of political violence? 
Ideal democracies are depicted in the literature as ensuring public participation in 
choosing who governs whom and what rules are applied to limit behaviors for both leaders 
and followers. Moreover, there are several indicators that measure the health of a democracy, 
such as equality, mutual trust among citizens, and the government's accountability (Bohara, 
Mitchell, & Nepal, 2006; Cunningham, 2002). However, as many developing democracies 
started emerging only after World War II, the conception of the ideal democracy, adorned 
with nuanced principles imported from consolidated democracies proved unfit to explain the 
more complex emerging democracies. Rostow (1960), a staunch advocate of modernization 
theory, has suggested that gradual industrial development and economic takeoff will enable 
“the emergence to political power of a group prepared to regard the modernization of the 
economy as serious, high-order political business” (p. 8). There are criticisms against this 
economic emphasis, however, particularly the assertion that industrialization in the 
developing world eventually leads to full-fledged democracy (Rostow, 1960, pp. 4-16). 
Caldeira and Holston (1999) have recognized the stark distinction between “non-western” 
and “canonized Euro-American democracies”. Although with altered views, Powell (1981) 
and Caldeira and Holston (1999) have suggested that there can be a distinctive scale to 
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understand the performance of a democracy, based on a political system‟s capacity of 
containing political violence. With an eye on investigating the distribution of historical 
legacies of violent political events, Hoppen (1994) qualifies the assumptions implied by 
Caldeira and Holston (1999) that the existence of political violence was common even in 
1840s western democracies. Throughout the literature, there are attempts to understand the 
differences between developed and developing democracies, which have resulted in a 
consensus that political violence is a differentiating feature.  
Can violence be used as a political tool?  
Bohara (2006) and Wilkinson (2004) have argued that political parties or contesting 
ideologies can incite violence against those who opt for rival political ideologies or ethnic 
identity. More specifically, Onapajo (2014) points out that an incumbent political party can 
selectively use political violence to influence the voter.  Although Bohara (2006), Wilkinson 
(2004), and Onapajo (2014) have argued that violence is a means of achieving certain 
political objectives, the literature has yet to fully categorize trends and patterns of violence 
and their relationship to the levels of political expectations. Hoppen (1994) categorizes the 
trends of violence into two broader categories, namely (i) crime against individuals (e.g. 
murder, and stabbing) and (ii) crime against property (e.g. forgery, bigamy, and „unnatural‟ 
acts), but the author does not address how this categorization is associated with political 
outcomes (pp. 601-2). Moreover, while Bohara (2006) contributes to the study of violence 
from the perspective of an insurgency, Onapajo (2014) and Höglund (2009) identify three 
major phases of violence: pre-electoral, electoral and post-electoral. Bohara (2006) and 
Onapajo (2014) conclude that incumbent political parties perpetrate higher levels of electoral 
violence because electoral violence is one of the affordable means to influence an electoral 
outcome. Unambiguously, the widespread use of violence can cause voters to refrain from 
registering to vote, and even trigger fear psychosis that can influence challengers to leave the 
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field (Höglund 2009; Onapajo 2014). In a state of political violence, even though there would 
be reduced electoral participation, Höglund (2009) notes that “people may vote for security, 
rather than to elect leaders based on their democratic merits” (p. 415). From the surveyed 
literature it is clear that political violence can be used to influence a political environment.  
Why violence works  
According to Blattman contemporary conflict literature is more concerned with the 
impact of voting on violence than the converse (Blattman, 2009, p. 231) Furthermore, the 
author suggests two seemingly opposing effects of political violence on voting behavior. On 
the one hand, political violence can create a positive impact on political participation; on the 
other hand political violence diminishes political participation. Blattman (2009) argues that 
violence can lead to greater political participation, supported by the positive impact of 
traumatic events (p. 231). Here, the scholar suggests that the positive impact of traumatic 
events can be caused by abduction, torture and violence witnessed by participants who are 
politically active. However, Trelles and Carreras (2012) contend the opposite, arguing that 
political violence reduces overall voter turnout. Both Trelles and Carreras (2012) and 
Blattman (2009) develop intuitive causal logic in their theories, but while backed by 
empirical evidence, the data for both is somewhat constrained. Blattman (2009) deals 
extensively with civil war whereas Trelles and Carreras (2012) derive their evidence 
exclusively from Mexico. Trelles and Carreras‟s (2012) definition of criminal violence leaves 
plenty of room for interpretation, such as differentiating politically targeted violence from 
violence associated with other social issues like drug cartels and arms smuggling. Jones, 
Troesken, and Walsh (2017) draw similar conclusions but their connection of violence and 
political participation is limited to the lynching of black voters in the American South. These 
two camps have many adherents, but the school of thought which has contended that violence 
contributes to increasing electoral participation has been unable to provide empirical 
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evidence to prove its point. Bateson (2012), for instance, concludes that crime victimization 
increases political participation whereas Blattman (2009) suggests electoral violence can lead 
to greater turnout during a civil war. Bateson (2012) and Blattman (2009) reach similar 
conclusions, but their contributions to the literature lack conclusive empirical evidence to 
back their arguments. Nevertheless, amongst the surveyed literature for this paper it is 
evident that to some extent political violence can increase political participation.  
What causes elites and masses to condone violence?  
The foundation of violence study has two major schools of thought: (i) people are 
naturally peaceful, or (ii) innately violence-prone. The great eighteen century European 
scholar Thomas Hobbes (as cited in Singh, 1976) contends that men are intrinsically 
violence-prone, living lives that are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short," whereas 
contemporary John Locke argues that men are naturally good and gentle in their way of life. 
However, the gap between these schools of thought is reduced by present-day rational and 
empirical analyses.  
Studies of political violence tend to examine the process in which people engage in 
violent events. According to Lichabach and Zuckerman (2009) many contributions to the 
violence literature focus on the question “How and why do people use violence to extend 
their political will over others or to defend their political position?” (p. 84). There are two 
major components to this question: (i) violence as a means to extend political will over others 
and (ii) violence as a means to defend political positions. Often the difference between these 
two sections is marginal or mutually exclusive because the tendency to extend political will 
can be done by leaders or followers. Lichabach and Zuckerman (2009) have also suggested 
that political violence can be used as a means to political end in a number of ways. Basically, 
the political end determines who is the violent actor. Thus, any systematic study to 
understand why political leaders use violence as a strategic tool to justify their political end 
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falls under the category of leadership approach, while citizenry approach deals with how 
political violence offers personal incentives for a citizen. For instance, a leader can perpetrate 
violence against civilians in order to defend the regime, an ethnic leader can be violent in the 
face of a potential threat, and during election season a leader can incite riots out of fear of 
losing votes. Here each leaders‟ tendency to adopt violence stems from their requirement to 
maintain hold on power . As a result any violence studies relating to a leader maintaining 
their political power falls under the leadership approach. However, Kalyvas (2006) suggests 
that the politicalization of private life can motivate people to engage in violence influenced 
by polarization, hatred and greed Kalyvas (2006) cautions that the “privatization of politics” 
can easily be confused with “the politicalization of private life” (p. 332). It is often difficult to 
distinguish whether an ordinary citizen is driven to violence by political motivations or in 
seeking personal revenge against friends and neighbors.  
In Fearon and Laitin‟s (2000) analysis of ethnic conflict, the authors divide violence 
by an elite and nonelite (follower) approach. They conceptualize violence as “explained as 
both a means and a by-product of political elites‟ efforts to hold or acquire power” (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2000, p. 853). They also contend that elites provoke violence to increase political 
support, which creates more hostile attitudes among followers and results in an environment 
more conducive to violence. However, nonelite violence provocation can happen to raise 
their in-group position while personal motivations like looting, land grabs, and revenge also 
contribute to nonelite violence engagement (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p. 874).   
Gurr's hypothesis is more likely aligned with the leadership perception of violence: 
“the causal sequence in political violence is; first, the development of discontent, second, the 
politicization of that discontent, and finally, its actualization in violent action against political 
objects and actors" (Gurr T. R., 1970, pp. 13-14). Höglund (2009) argues that the need for 
security drives citizens to go vote for someone who is violent. In Weintraub, Vargas, and 
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Flores study of the 2014 Colombian presidential election, the authors state that in insurgency 
violence, support for a candidate who opposes peace might increase and support for a pro-
peace process might decrease (Weintraub, Vargas, & Flores, 2015, p. 3). Utilizing arguments 
grounded in political psychology some scholars maintain that long-time exposure to violence 
can make people support militant policies and parties (Canetti, Elad-Strenger, Lavi, Guy, & 
Bar-Tal, 2015; Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, Bar-Tal, & Hobfoll, 2012).  
Also important is an understanding of the literature on violence sponsored by political 
parties: what makes people participate in collective political violence in developing 
democracies? Answers can be divided into three different sections: (i) individual identity 
within a group, (ii) protection and protraction of power, and (iii) resource allocation politics. 
Littman and Paluck (2015) suggest a clear problem of endogeneity, where “group 
identification motivates violent behavior and violent behavior increases identification with a 
violent group” (p. 79). The authors claim that groups recruit their members and motivate 
them to engage in violence to pursue economic, political, and social goals (Littman & Paluck, 
2015). Often, these kinds of collective organizations motivate their members in such a way 
that they are encouraged to go beyond individual integrity in the perpetration of violence, 
under the pretext of acting in the group's collective interest. The question that arises is what 
do they fight for? Is it a fight against government suppression, a fight against other political 
parties, ethnic groups or special interest groups? While there are several possible answers, 
intergroup conflict based on the scarcity of resources is one of the most compelling reasons 
for violence.  
A recent body of literature deals with the relationship between electoral results, 
resource allocation, and political violence. Chaturvedi (2005) and Boone (2011) have argued 
that in emerging democracies, political parties deploy muscle power, sometimes through 
party activists, student leaders, or professional bullying agents. As Chaturvedi (2005) states, 
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this is done “either to force ideological supporters of the competing party to vote in their 
favour or restrain them from voting” (p. 189). Chaturvedi (2005) further suggests that a party 
with lower initial support can resort to more violence than others. However, if the incumbent 
deploys resources, then the competition becomes more violent. Boone (2011) on the other 
hand, argues that politicians intentionally allocate certain land rights to favor their supporters 
and to punish their opponents, consequently inducing massive land-related violence around 
elections. While it is clear that leaders have incentives to support violence, it remains unclear 
why voters support violence. Gurr (1968) attempts to address that by suggesting that when 
there is a gap between an individual's expectations and the actuality, that individual gets 
angry and frustrated. Gurr's deprivation argument serves as the theoretical backbone of this 
assumption. 
Although the majority of the literature on political violence deals with the leadership 
perspective other perspectives like the citizen approach are not necessarily excluded. 
However, from among the surveyed literature, there are few works that include the citizenry 
perspective on violence.  
The theory of relative deprivation and political violence  
Gurr (1972) presents three major psychological theories of violence, as (i) instinctual 
aggression, (ii) learned aggression and, (iii) aggression activated by frustration (p.33). While 
there are contending views on whether aggressive behavior is an instinct, Gurr proposes it is 
most likely a learned behavior that gets picked up in one's environment. Sometimes 
aggressive behavior is “purposive” and goal-oriented against a rival group of individuals 
(Gurr, 1968, p. 250). Moreover, long term exposure to a violent political environment often 
makes people tolerant and indifferent towards violence. The theory advanced here relies on 
Gurr's third perspective on aggression: it can be induced by frustration.  
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Voters in a consolidated democracy are often moved by developmental approaches 
portrayed by leaders; basically, underlying promises define for whom to vote. By embarking 
on the democratic voyage, citizens are promised that their voices will be heard. They will 
have a say on how laws are written, rights interpreted, and resources allocated. In the early 
days of a developing democracy, citizens organically develop specific expectations, most of 
which are based on what citizens of developed democracies have been able to achieve. 
According to Gurr (1968), the condoning of violence happens when voters are deprived of 
those expectations, in what he terms the gap between legitimate expectation and actuality (p. 
253). As groups of voters become deprived by their opponents, despite the presence of 
democracy, they become frustrated. These frustrations are often intensified by relative 
deprivation based on ideological preferences: opposition versus incumbent. As mentioned 
earlier, the sequence of political violence follows the development of discontent, the 
politicization of that discontent, and finally, its actualization in violent action against political 
objects and actors. Here, the development of discontent can be politically motivated by 
groupings among competing ideological forces, but an individual as part of an ideological 
group can follow the same process of actualization in violent action against political actors.  
While opposing political parties might be blamed for their feelings of frustration, their 
higher level of abstraction shields them from becoming the targets of this frustration: it is 
simply too unfulfilling to place blame on an entity or institution. Opposition voters, on the 
other hand, are not abstract. They are real, voters know who they are, interact with and can 
put a face on them. This “concreteness” tricks the frustrated voter into switching blame from 
the party to the party supporter. The countenance of violence is simply the manifestation of 
their frustration: if opposition voters are responsible for their frustration, then any violence 
that befalls them is well deserved. When a voter has been harboring violent or vindictive 
feelings towards another group of voters, they will naturally gravitate towards an actor who 
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delivers violence against that frustration maker. Instead of rejecting that violence as 
undemocratic, feelings of frustration will direct that person toward interpreting violence as 
rightful retribution for having caused their frustration. In other words, frustration will cause 
that violence to be interpreted as deserved. Over time, a repeating mechanism develops in 
which deprivation fuels anger, anger fuels frustration, and frustration causes people to 
condone political violence. This mechanism is the underlying argument for the hypothesis 
developed here. 
Hypothesis 
When people see there is a gap between their legitimate expectation and actuality they 
feel relatively deprived. As a result, they feel vindictive towards those who are responsible 
for the deprivation. Consequently, people feeling this vindictive sentiment throw their 
support behind political violence, if not directly, then condoning any violent event happening 
before them. 
Hypothesis: Greater deprivation will yield higher support for political violence while 
lesser deprivation will garner lower support for political violence. 
After considering all the surveyed literature, it can be concluded that developing 
democracies lack important norms and standard procedures of governance which are 
necessary for the better functioning of a nation. As a result, there is a gap between public 
expectations and reality. The larger gap means greater deprivation, and when there are 
deprivations among those who have not received equal treatment resentment builds towards 
those who have. Vindictive sentiment as a result of deprivation encourages aggrieved 
individuals to condone violence perpetrated against the others.   
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CHAPTER THREE: CASE SELECTION 
Where and how to calculate the relationship between relative deprivation and support 
for political violence 
Political violence is prevalent in several countries. Primarily, this research utilizes the 
2018 The Economist's Democracy Index to shortlist some countries which are average-
performing democracies.  Keeping limitations in mind, this study focuses on studying 
Bangladesh as the best case for analysis. Confrontational political culture provides a breeding 
ground for massive political violence in Bangladesh. Moreover, scarcity of public resources 
creates improper distribution system which ultimately yields room for deprivation in the 
country. This section accounts for the case selection process followed by a conceptual 
background on political violence in Bangladesh. 
The Selection Process 
Political violence as a social phenomenon is present on almost every continent, from 
Africa to Latin America and Asia. To study the relationship between relative deprivation and 
political violence, this study first must establish which countries fulfill two major conditions: 
(i) they are a moderately performing democracy, and (ii) a country with scarce public 
resources. To accomplish this, an appropriate indicator for democratic performance must be 
determined. The objective is to find a case which is just above the borderline of dictatorship 
but below the line of above-average performing democracies. Although there could be 
relative deprivation-driven political violence in a dictatorial country like North Korea, 
Afghanistan, or Myanmar, this study rejects these cases because there will is limited access to 
data for those countries. On the other hand, this study should not include any democracy 
which is performing above average, like United States of America (USA), United Kingdom 
(UK), and France because a democracy with little scarcity in public resources will more 
likely promote peace instead of political violence. To narrow the list of potential countries, 
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this study has utilized a ready-to-use tool, the “2018 Economist Intelligence Unit's 
Democracy Index (Economist, 2018).” The index itself does not provide any insight into the 
level of relative deprivation in the case country even though it can be a powerful instrument 
to serve the purpose of the study. However, in applying the democracy index, several 
Southeast Asian countries are compatible with the criteria. The democracy index has 
identified these countries as 'hybrids' because they are just above the dictatorship margin but 
below the above-average performing democracies defined as 'flawed democracy.' 
The list of countries with the desired attributes includes Thailand, Bhutan, Nepal, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan. Thailand and Bhutan must be excluded because Thailand is 
currently governed by a military government and Bhutan‟s adoption of democracy is too 
recent to serve the purposes of this study. Pakistan and Nepal also must be excluded because 
these two countries exhibit significant inter-ethnic violence which could muddle the data 
collection process. It is difficult to separate ethnic violence from electoral violence. As such, 
Bangladesh emerges as the best option among the remaining three countries.  
Political violence in Bangladesh has drawn the attention of the media, scholars, and 
social commentators. Hussain Zillur Rahman, a prominent Bangladeshi social analyst, argues 
that political violence in Bangladesh is better understood through power dynamics. Rahman 
(1990) classifies these as, “how power motivates the aspiring individual, how ruling groups 
accumulate, hold and exercise power within society, and finally to what extent overt 
violations of social norms of justice impinge upon threshold levels of tolerance of the 
common people” (p. 2622). Individual power entrepreneurs in Bangladesh do whatever is 
needed to protect and prolong their power. They rely on power brokers (such as local cadres, 
students, or professional agents of violence) to facilitate their transactions. Ruling elites in 
Bangladesh accumulate power by rigging elections, orchestrating bureaucratic favors and 
often using their incumbency with little regard for constitutional prescriptions. Constitutional 
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prescription is here defined as basic human rights like freedom and liberty to work, self-
expression, access to food, health, and schooling. Incumbents use these basic human rights 
principles as the basis of discrimination against their opponents, using favored resource 
allocation. In their efforts to maintain control, Bangladeshi political elites often turn to 
violence as their tool of choice. Several triggers have been associated with outbreaks of 
political violence in Bangladesh, the most common being public resource allocation and 
distribution, electoral rigging, favoring contractors who support the incumbent government in 
different public development projects, illegal river dredging projects, speaking up against the 
regime, suppressing the opposition, and war crimes tribunals (Suykens & Islam, 2015). A 
large portion of political violence is state-sponsored, also known as extrajudicial killings. 
With levels of democracy matching the requirements imposed by the theory and political 
violence being such a well-documented part of the Bangladeshi political environment, it 
naturally rises as an appropriate case for the test.  
Background of Relative Deprivation and Political Violence in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh has a long, confrontational political history starting in 1971 after the 
political separation from Pakistan. Although a democratic government was initially 
established, repeated military interventions into politics have hampered the smooth function 
of democracy. The restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991 inherited many political 
attributes that have hindered the government‟s development. The emergent Bangladesh 
democracy after 1991 features "a wide array of confrontation, competition, monopolization of 
state institutions and (public) resources by the party in power" (Osman, 2010, p. 310). Osman 
(2010) has argued that politics by its very nature is confrontational because it has to deal with 
conflicting interests. The success of a polity depends on the capacity to balance conflicting 
demands to minimize potential damage.  
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The confrontational politics of Bangladesh offer a breeding ground for intense 
political competition to mobilize and monopolize public resources by the winning political 
party while depriving the loser. There are some underlying approaches portrayed by Osman 
(2010) which supply the foundation of the political system in Bangladesh such as: 
Clientelism and Relative Deprivation  
Similar to other countries in the Global South, Bangladesh is marked by clientelism. 
In this country, political leaders offer protection similar to a patron, while in exchange voters 
give them support for their activities. Clientelism works in this democracy because public 
resources are monopolized by the winning power, leaving no room for voters as a client to go 
against them. Clientelism is the lifeblood of violent, insecure, and confrontational political 
systems (Migdal, 1988). Clientelism persists in Bangladesh despite its pernicious attributes 
because the country lacks political leaders are forced to utilize very limited public resources 
judiciously to protect and protract their power.  Politicians apply those public resources in 
two ways: (i) to attract people from opposing groups, and (ii) to retain its in-group members. 
Because Bangladesh has a scarcity of public resources, any allocation by state leaders to their 
preferred group, ensures relative deprivation. 
Political Party, Criminality and Violence 
 Since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the nation has been broadly divided 
into two major political camps (Jahan, 2014). Both of these camps are strong enough to 
polarize the nation into two different blocks. Although there are several other political parties 
which play into the political system, generally the political system comes under the umbrella 
of either the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) or Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). BAL 
is a more secular and progressive political party while the BNP is a nationalistic and religious 
political party. According to Moniruzzaman, “a dominant aspect of the party-system in 
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Bangladesh is its culture of violence. It has become commonplace for political parties to 
often engage in street violence (Moniruzzaman, 2009, p. 84).”  
Each prime political party has its youth-student wing which serves as the mechanism 
for perpetrating violence (Moniruzzaman, 2009). International Crisis Group has reported that 
“they (student-youth groups) are used to expand influence and entrench control, often by 
force, over resources and turf, including on college campuses” (ICG, 2016, p. 4). The 
political party in power exploits the state mechanism to suppress the opposition while the 
opposition spares no opportunity to destabilize the incumbent (Khan S. R., 2014). Odhikar, 
one of the prominent human rights organization in Bangladesh, describes Bangladeshi 
political culture as “relentlessly violent” (ICG, 2016, p. 4).  From 2002 to 2013 there have 
been 14,187 violent incidents among which more than 40 per cent of the events are classified 
as inter-party violence between BAL and BNP (Suykens & Islam, 2015). The two tables 
(Table 1 and 2) below show the distribution of political violence in Bangladesh from 2002 to 
2013 as well as actor engagement percentage. 
Table 1  
The distribution of political violence in Bangladesh from 2002 to 2013 
 Events Wounded Lethal Casualties 
N % N % N % 
2002 668 4.7% 6015 4.8% 113 4.7% 
2003 639 4.5% 5833 4.6% 116 4.8% 
2004 910 6.4% 9433 7.5% 170 7.0% 
2005 989 7.0% 7896 6.2% 271 11.2% 
2006 2051 14.5% 21607 17.1% 330 13.7% 
2007 274 1.9% 1689 1.3% 90 3.7% 
2008 379 2.7% 2413 1.9% 84 3.5% 
2009 985 6.9% 5975 4.7% 105 4.4% 
2010 993 7.0% 8542 6.8% 139 5.7% 
2011 1096 7.7% 12159 9.6% 124 5.1% 
2012 1333 9.4% 14442 11.4% 109 4.5% 
2013 3870 27.3% 30353 24.0% 765 31.7% 
Total 14187 100% 126355 100% 2418 100% 





Involvement of major actors in violent events in Bangladesh (from 2002 to 2013) 
 Events Wounded Lethal Casualties 
 N % N % N % 
Bangladesh Awami League 
(BAL) 
6330 44.8% 58578 46.4% 536 22.3% 
Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party (BNP) 
6240 44.1% 66112 52.4% 640 26.6% 
State Actor 3521 24.9% 54963 43.6% 1279 53.1% 
Jamat-e-Islam 2076 14.7% 18210 14.4% 450 18.7% 
Note: Data for major actors of violent events in Bangladesh is derived from Suykens and 
Islam (2015) 
 
Manifestation of Political Violence 
An analysis of Bangladeshi political culture is necessary to grasp the magnitude of 
political violence in the nation. Essentially, Bangladeshi political culture is rooted in two 
kinds of interactions between leaders and followers: (i) institutional: such as boycotts and 
strikes, and (ii) non-institutional: such as threats, extortion and murder. However, 
Moniruzzaman points out in Bangladesh, “institutional interaction between parties is largely 
overshadowed by non-institutional methods of interaction, which create the scope for 
political violence” (Moniruzzaman, 2009, p. 91).  
Additionally, Moniruzzaman (2009) has argued that boycotts are a necessary 
instrument for opposition parties in a healthy democracy. Opposition parties in Bangladesh 
frequently use these tactics to undermine the party in power. As a result, the incumbent 
government gets the opportunity to make the best out of the absence of the opposition. 
However, these boycotts primarily take place when opposition parties are deprived of their 
rights to voice concern for any policy, law or bill. According to Ahmed “The usual reasons 
given for parliamentary boycott are: not giving the opposition a fair chance to speak in 
parliament, partisan behavior of the speaker, rejection of opposition motions and breaching 
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the privileges of the opposition” (Ahmed, 2002, p. 203). The outcome of boycotts becomes 
messy when the opposition party takes the issue to the streets. As Moniruzzaman has 
describes “Armed confrontations on such occasions usually end in bloodshed which leads the 
opposition to a tougher stand, thereby taking boycott politics to a higher level 
(Moniruzzaman, 2009, p. 92). Boycott and strikes are two of the institutional instruments 
which are frequently misused by political parties of Bangladesh. These institutional 
instruments breed other non-institutional violent events exposing general people towards a 
circle of violent political culture. 
Extortion, murder and treats are considered as non-institutional instruments of 
violence. Non-institutional means, formally those events have no constitutional backup or 
recognition as they involve unjustified physical or mental trauma. According to Hossain 
during 1995 alone there were more than 5,000 cases of violence: 60,000 crimes were 
recorded that included 1,300 killings, 1,100 abductions and 2,900 cases of torture (Hossain, 
1996, pp. 198-199). Bangladeshi political culture encourages political parties to ask their 
supporters and loyalists to be violent and aggressive towards their opponents. Any non-
institutional violent event breeds further violent events as response to the initial event. 
As mentioned previously, this study seeks to establish the optimal case country based 
on two criteria, (i) its democratic performance, and (ii) level of deprivation based on public 
resource distribution. Bangladesh meets these criteria because it is an average-performing 
democratic country and citizens are relatively deprived based on their political preference. 
The prevalence of non-institutional modes of violence such as extortion, murder, and threat in 
Bangladesh makes it further optimal as a case study. The theory established here contends 
that political parties encourage violent events in order to gain as much as possible from the 
situation. Low levels of tolerance and high distrust among political parties and individual 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
METHODOLOGY, TESTING THE THEORY AND ADDRESSING THEORETICAL 
CHALLENGES 
Studying political violence is a daunting issue in social science as it involves risk and 
sensitivity. Moreover, factors such as time constraints, budget and technical capacity have 
limited the methodology of this study. This research bases its findings on a secondary source 
for empirical evidence. The original dataset reflects information accumulated by following a 
vignette method. The quantitative nature of the dataset provides an opportunity to reach 
conclusions precisely, but it runs the risk of masking nuance which might be important to 
understanding the overall phenomena. This section begins with a discussion on methodology, 
followed by the test result. It then addresses the theoretical challenges of studying political 
violence. 
Methodology 
The primary expectation of this study is to collect data using a field survey. The goal 
here is to assess the theorized connection between relative deprivation and public tendency to 
condone political violence. As this study is designed to fulfill the requirements of a master‟s 
thesis, there are some limitations like time and budget. Considering these limitations, this 
study is based on a secondary source, a survey conducted by Haque (2019) in Bangladesh. 
Haque‟s (2019) dataset is utilized because the survey‟s questionnaire complies with this 
study‟s theoretical requirements, including data on deprivation and violence. The survey 
contains the same two basic concepts established here: political violence and relative 
deprivation. Furthermore, the survey‟s operationalization of these two concepts permits a 
practical observation of political violence and relative deprivation as variables. 
Operational Definition of Political Violence  
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Political violence as a term in everyday use is difficult to describe because the concept 
itself is ideologically loaded and varied between disciplines. Porta (2006) suggests that any 
physical force to inflict damage can be considered as violence while Graham and Gurr (1969) 
add that violence can happen to injure people physically as well as to damage their property. 
Moreover, violence could be intentional or accidental and it can have political aims. Porta 
specifies the definition of political violence as, “the use of physical force in order to damage 
a political adversary” (Porta, 2006, p. 2). Violence is divided in two different categories: (i) 
macro level analysis- collective, state sponsored, or ethnic/group violence, and (ii) micro-
level analysis- individual as the center of violence. This study does not concentrate on the 
macro- analysis of violence but instead focuses on the micro- analysis. The micro- analysis of 
violence has some adherents in the literature, for example, Gurr (1970) argues that people at 
the individual level engage in violence when there are gaps between expectations and 
capabilities, whereas Kornhauser (1959) claims that people who resort to political violence at 
an individual (micro level) are uprooted socially. However, both Gurr (1970) and Porta 
(2006) suggest that violence at in individual level tends to portray psychological factors. For 
this study‟s purposes, the operational definition of political violence includes any physical 
torture, verbal abuse and property damage caused by political adversary. This study focuses 
only on the micro- analysis which includes an individual‟s psychology in condoning political 
violence occurring in proximity to them. Here, political adversary is meant by individual 
antagonistic psychology caused by contending ideological preferences. However, this study 
seeks to identify individual attidues condoning political violence by presenting scenarios that 
potray both collective- and individual-level violent events. Here, the aim is to determine the 
psychology behind condoning violence by exposing respondents to some hypothetical violent 
scenarios.   
Operational Definition of Relative Deprivation 
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Stouffer (1949) introduces the term relative deprivation in a socio-psychological study 
of American armed forces. The observes dissatisfaction among soliders based on the 
assessment of their situation compared to other soldiers. Stouffer consciously studies the non-
material aspects of dissatisfaction among soldiers. Relative deprivation as a concept is often 
confused with relative poverty and relative fulfillment because the basic elements of those 
concepts are highly mutually exclusive. Townsend suggests that relative deprivation is the 
feeling of unhappiness caused by social comparison of an individual‟s “customs and needs” 
(Townsend, 1979, p. 35). Deprivation scholars have broken down the concept into various 
categories: absolute-relative, personal-collective and social-economic, etc. Here the focus is 
on the personal relative deprivation defined by Greitemeyer and Sagioglou (2019) as “being 
at a disadvantage and perceiving this predicament to be unfair are at the core of the 
experience of personal relative deprivation” (p.664). The theoritical foundation of this 
research limits its scope by focusing on relative deprivation induced by political preference. 
This study moves forward with the operational definition of relative deprivation as the feeling 
of dissatisfaction among people when their access to public resources is limited due to their 
political preference.  
This study is motivated by scholarly contributions from (i) Collier and Vicente (2013) 
which addresses how anti-violence campaigns decrease perceptions of violence in low-
income democracies, and (ii) McKay and Collard (2003) as they address the best survey 
practices to understand the issue of deprivation. The above-mentioned literature deploys a 
vignette method which offers each respondent a short narrative before responding to a 
question.  
Design of the Survey 
The primary focus of this study is to investigate how relative deprivation causes 
people to condone political violence. It is often challenging to figure out to what extent 
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people condone political violence, as individuals intrinsically avoid admitting if they support 
violence publicly. The vignette questionnaire is utilized as a potential method to investigate 
the tendency to condone violence because it is a method often used by social psychologists 
when surveying topics that are difficult for the respondent, like drug abuse, alcoholism, 
sexuality and violence (O'Connor, Davies, Heffernan, & Eijk, 2003). A vignette method 
follows a procedure to present a hypothetical situation and ask respondents to reveal their 
attitudes towards a given scenario.  
This study‟s survey has two major sections: (i) the front end of the survey collects 
data that serves as a proxy for the respondent's deprivation, and (ii) the back end of the survey 
which consists of the various vignettes and collects answers that are proxies for condoning 
violence. The primary objective of the vignettes is to encourage participants to replace 
themselves within the narrative in such a way that their answers can be perceived as an 
honest insight into what they would do if they have been in a similar situation. The survey 
includes a random selection process, reaching approximately one hundred and fifty 
participants. There are no specific occupation brackets for participants but they have to be at 
least 18 years old to participate in the study. 
The appendix here contains these generic questions as well as vignettes which have 
survey utilizes. It also contains the underlining background and overall thought process 
behind each vignette. Note that the survey itself is conducted in Bangladesh although the 
questionnaire has been translated by the author to English. 
Reviewing Variables 
This study utilizes a dataset which includes some independent variables as well as 
dependent variables. The list of the independent variable comprises: level of education, 
access to electric power, money spent on connectivity, number of people sharing a bedroom, 
leisure and exotic food opportunities in a certain time, tendency to borrow from neighbors, 
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healthcare affordability, frequency of seeking political help, and time spent on daily travel. 
The list for dependent variables contains: attitudes toward condoning violence related to 
healthcare, police services, government subsidies, judicial service and labor unrest. 
This study attempts to understand the correlation between deprivation and the 
tendency to condone political violence. Different aspects of deprivation that average citizens 
face in their everyday lives such as accommodation, food, utilities, communication and 
healthcare have been utilized in the front end (McKay & Collard, 2003). For a respondent to 
be considered a supporter of violence, he or she has to answer the vignette questions on a 
given number scale in a way that suggests support for violence. Those scores will then be 
weighted against their levels of deprivation. For example, one question asks with how many 
people the respondent has to share their bedroom.  The question includes a scale ranging from 
sharing a bedroom with no one to more than three people. Here it is assumed that any 
respondent who shares their bedroom with no one is considered not being deprived at all 
while any respondent who shares a bedroom with more than three people is considered 
deprived the most. All other respective questions are designed based on a deprivation scale.  
However, in terms of calculating the attitudes of condoning political violence, each 
vignette question presents a scenario which has been responded to by the participants based 
on a scale ranging from 1 to 10 points. Each vignette is designed to portray a situation with 
two contending political groups, with one being deprived by the other. In a balanced 
approach, the vignettes present violent events perpetrated by both groups and the respondents 
are asked to rank how they will react on the violent event presented before them. To address 
research biases the survey maker has intentionally avoided asking the respondent about which 
group's violent event they react positively or negatively toward; rather they are asked simply 
how they will react to the violent events. 
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The dataset is coded using 0 to 10 scales. It is assumed that if the respondents choose 
0 it means they are following the highest level of condemnation while 10 means the strongest 
attitude in condoning a violent event. However the range is broken down in five different 
segments, where 0-1 means a respondent is condemning violence, 2-3 means condemning to 
some extent, 4-5 means neither condoning nor condemning, 6-7 means condoning to some 
extent and lastly 8-10 means a respondent condoning very strongly. 
Testing the Theory: Regression Results and Analyses 
This section presents and interprets the results of the survey data in order to identify 
the strength of the relationship between perceived deprivation indicators and attitudes of 
condoning political violence. The dataset is analyzed through several regression models to 
study the relationship between independent variables (deprivation indicators) and dependent 
variables (attitudes toward condoning violence). Each regression model is designed to 
examine multiple independent variables in respect to a dependent variable.  Hence, the study 
has employed several rounds of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with each of 
the 9 independent and 5 dependent variables of the dataset. The original dataset contains 156 
observations in total. The OLS method is expected to produce statistical evidence to 
determine the relationship between relative deprivation and attitude toward condoning 
political violence.  
In order to analyze the relationship between independent and dependent variables of 
the dataset, this study runs models using the statistical software, „R‟. The dataset has 
produced five different models and an additional model combining all. The robustness of 
each relationship produced by the regression analyses is evaluated here.  
Table 3  









































































































































Note: ***p-value<0.001, **p-value<0.05, *p-value<0.10. 
    Each cell represents Coefficient and Standard Error 
 
In the Table 3, the model of condoning violence relating to Police Service, Health 
Care, Agro Subsidy, Judicial Service and Labor Unrest are fitted on the independent variables 
Power Cut, Phone Bill, Bedroom Share, Leisure, Exotic Food, Borrowing, Transportation, 
Private Hospital and Political Help. A combined model of condoning violence is fitted on the 
same independent variables. The estimated coefficient of all the independent variables and 
standard errors are presented in the table. To check whether the independent variables have a 
significant effect on the dependent variables (condoning attitudes of violence) corresponding 
P-Values are also reported in the table. Overall from the model most of the variables are 
insignificant. The attached P-Value defines the significance of the data where more than 95% 
level of confidence is considered robust. 
However, Model 1 reveals that Borrowing is significant at 95% level of confidence 
while Sharing Bedroom is relatively less significant at 90% level of confidence. The other 
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variables in the model are not significant. Hence, Model 1 expresses that the relationship 
between sharing a bedroom with more people inversely impacts the attitude of condoning 
violence. In other words, when a respondent is sharing a bedroom with more people they will 
more likely condemn the disservice done by the police. Additionally Model 1 shows that 
borrowing from neighbors positively impacts the attitudes toward condoning violence. 
Essentially, people who borrow more often are more likely to condone the disservice done by 
the police.  
Model 2 provides more or less the same outcome as Model 1. This model predicts 
very precisely with a P-Value less than 0.001 that when an individual is sharing his or her 
bedroom with more people they are less likely to condone political violence related to health 
care. However, in terms of borrowing from neighbors, the model expresses that a person who 
borrows more frequently will more likely condone political violence related to healthcare. 
Although the model shows there is a relationship between borrowing and condoning 
violence, the robustness of the relationship is low with a P-Value less than 0.10. Moreover, 
Model 5 achieves one significant relationship among all the variables. It shows that there is a 
robust relationship (P-Value less than 0.001) between seeking political help and condoning 
violence related to labor unrest. In other words, when people tend to seek more political help 
they will likely condone violent attitudes related to labor unrest.  
Overall, the combined model shows 95% significant level of confidence when 
drawing conclusion on the relationship between borrowing from people and tendency to 
condone political violence. Therefore, when people tend to borrow more, they will more 
likely condone political violence in general. In summary, the combined regression models 
show that among the nine determinants of perceived deprivations, borrowing has the greatest 
influence on attitudes toward condoning political violence. Among the remaining eight 
determinants, most have limited (more than 5% chance of error) or no statistical significance.  
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From the regression analyses, it is evident that the perceived relationship between 
relative deprivation and attitudes toward condoning political violence holds true for only a 
limited number of variables. Therefore it can be concluded that the dataset does not supply 
significant evidence to prove the hypothesis. As a result it cannot be said that relative 
deprivation leads people to condone political violence. There are numerous drawbacks in the 
dataset which could have contributed to this conclusion. It could be that the conceptual 
framework lacks essential components to support the hypothesis. Additionally, the small 
sample size or deficiencies of the field survey could have adversely impacted the findings. 
The following section analyzes these potential limitations and their effects on the conclusion. 
Addressing Theoretical Challenges 
The strength of a social science investigation is not limited by how widely it has been 
accepted within the field but rather by its ability to identify new avenues of research related 
to the issue. Relative deprivation and political violence is one such theory, first examined by 
Gurr in the 1970s. Feierabend, Feierabend and Gurr (1972) argue that when there is a 
“discrepancy between social value expectation and value capabilities,” people become 
frustrated, “which in turn results in the expression of political violence” (pp. 2-3). There are 
several criteria that social science scholars utilize to evaluate a theory. One of the commonly 
accepted ways is to look into the strength of empirical data used as a foundation of the theory. 
Here, by the scientific foundation, it is established that regardless of time, place, or subject, 
the theory must be grounded by empirical data that has been collected to verify the 
assumptions. A question that follows is what to do if the data does not support the theory. 
Unfortunately, there is no single answer to this question for a social science researcher.  One 
of the reasons could be that social science investigators operate around very subtle nuances of 
social issues which are often difficult to quantify. For instance, Stephen G. Brush‟s (1996) 
case study on the rise and fall of Gurr's theory of collective violence based on the relative 
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deprivation provides a historical sketch of Gurr's theory, revealing that there was a spike in 
the popularity of the theory followed by a downturn when more researchers experimented 
with empirical data to verify the foundation. Brush's historiographical analysis is based on the 
initial 15 years with 649 citations: apart from 145 neutral citations, there are 181 favorable 
and 192 unfavorable citations. As some of the favorable citations turn into unfavorable the 
proponent himself brings some ad-hoc adaptations into the theory. Some researchers suggest 
that the original theory holds true in some cases when manipulated while some outright 
decline the credibility of the theory based on numerical analysis.  However, this does not 
imply that the lack of empirical evidence has led to the rejection of Gurr's theory of 
deprivation and violence. Many other aspects of the theory are still evaluated within the 
literature. Nonetheless, Brush (1996) suggests considering the non-empirical aspects of an 
investigation along with the mechanisms. 
The foundation of this research assumes that when people feel relatively deprived 
they may support political violence. In order to study this relationship, this study borrows a 
dataset from Haque (2019). The original dataset offers 9 independent variables indicating 
deprivations and 5 dependent variables offering attitudes of condoning violence. In order to 
collect evidence for the dependent variables the researcher has applies vignette method. This 
study is built on the precept that this method helps respondents to place themselves in a 
hypothetical scenario, but in reality it appears attitudes toward political violence are sensitive 
and as a result people are reticent to expose themselves publicly even if they condone 
political violence privately. Therefore, respondents‟ discomfort with reporting their true 
sentiments may have impacted the overall outcome of the study. Furthermore, the close-
ended nature of the questionnaire may have left no room to accommodate the reasons behind 
their attitudes towards violence. Finally, the dataset is a small-scale endeavour. Any or all of 
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these limitations could have contributed to the face that the variables in the empirical analysis 
did not achieve statistical significance in support of the hypothesis. 
It is recognized that political violence is an inevitable reality for the case country 
(Bangladesh): from 2001 to 2019 there have been 212,535 violent political incidents reported 
which includes 207,536 cases of injury and 4,999 murder cases. Moreover, there have been 
646 reported incidents of alleged torture by law enforcement agencies from 2004 to 2019 and 
1171 reported cases of public lynchings from 2009 to 2019 (Khan A. R., 2020). Population 
growth puts added pressure on allocation of scarce public resources, further allowing for 
deprivation to occur. This deprivation is systemic, rooted in the relationship between the 
incumbent and opposition political parties. The political ideology of Bangladesh is largely 
divided into two camps: the progressive secular camp and nationalist religious camp (Jahan, 
2014). It could be said that the country accounts for the presence of deprivation and violence 
separately but based on the empirical evidence the relationship is not conclusive. As argued 
earlier, there are most likely social nuances present in this dynamic which must be accounted 
for in the empirical data. 
Social and behavioral scientists face challenges when assessing any particular 
behavior conducted by self-report method. This approach has some advantages including no 
lab requirement, limited ethical challenges and low budget experimentation, but it leaves 
plenty of room for suboptimal results. According to Lobbestae‟s investigation, “…aggression 
is highly socially unacceptable, and therefore particularly likely to be underreported on 
because of social desirability…additionally, self-report of aggression could be unreliable due 
to lack of insight” (Lobbestael, 2015, p. 1). 
Probably this is likely one of the reasons why laboratory experiments on aggressive 
behavior are different from the self-report assessment. The current investigation is a self-
report assessment which aims to determine the relationship between relative deprivation and 
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attitude of condoning political violence. The methodology does not permit conducting a 
controlled experiment in a laboratory. The biggest challenge for this study is how to ask 
respondents about their attitude on political violence: directly or anonymously. Lobbestae 
(2015) argues that it will be difficult to measure the actual support for violence by both of 
these approaches because: (i) for the overt approach, the respondents will be aware of the fact 
that their positive response will be counted as socially unacceptable, whereas (ii) the covert 
approach, respondents will not be able to simply place themselves into the presented 
hypothetical situation.  
At this point, it can be concluded that it is challenging but not impossible to study 
how relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. Similar to other 
sensitive social science issues, accumulating empirical evidence on political violence is 
difficult because people are reluctant to tell the truth. It is often expensive and time-
consuming to reveal the truth. So the best way to mitigate the challenges of a social science 
research experiment is to provide the investigator the freedom and flexibility necessary to dig 
deeper into the evidence.  
The statistical results do not provide sufficient evidence to claim that relative 
deprivation causes people to condone political violence. However, there may be some points 
which are obvious but overlooked throughout the study. One of those points may be, for 
instance, the theoretical absurdity. Gurr, the pioneer of deprivation and violence theory, was 
criticized after he proposed the theory in the 1970s. Several contemporary scholars have 
proved that his assumption doesn't hold in several cases. Other limitations with the study may 
point to the challenges of accumulating data on violence. No one wants to expose their 
attitude towards violence; even if they support violence because they fear social castigation. 
Another potential reason may be the limited sample size of the dataset. As violence is a 
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sensitive issue, 156 observations may be insufficient to determine the relationship between 




CHAPTER FIVE: LIMITATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION  
Although the surveyed literature and background details of the case study have 
provided ample of evidence that political violence is prevalent in Bangladesh, it is 
inconclusive whether relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. This 
study has identified limitations which may have affected the overall conclusion of research. 
This section provides a detailed explanation of those limitations of the study along with 
recommendations for future research.  
Limitations of the Study 
The data does not produce statistically significant evidence to corroborate the theory. 
The lack of evidence is speculated to be the result of a less than perfect match between the 
hypothesis and the survey designed and implemented by Haque (2019). The following 
section will discuss why the dataset does not produce evidence and will shed light on the 
problems that can be addressed if this instrument is to be repurposed for future research.  
Section 2 of the survey is meant to capture questions related to deprivation, the key 
causal factor driving the theory. This section asks several socio-economic questions that are 
taken as proxies for deprivation, such as the consumption of exotic foods, frequency of 
vacation or use of comfortable transportation. Here it is required to measure to what extent 
people are deprived in their daily lives and how these deprivations potentially lead them to 
condone political violence. There are several suggested changes to redraft the Section 2 
questions:  
Section 2- Questions on Deprivation:  
Question-1: I feel deprived when I think about what I have compared to what other 
people like me have (sense of personal deprivation). 
A: disagree strongly  
B: disagree  
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C: neither agree nor disagree  
D: agree  
E: agree strongly 
Question-2: In my relationship with others, I can get people to listen to what I say 
(personal sense of power). 
A: disagree strongly  
B: disagree  
C: neither agree nor disagree  
D: agree  
E: agree strongly 
Question-3: I admire people who can afford exotic food, expensive homes, and 
clothes (sense of materialism). 
A: disagree strongly  
B: disagree  
C: neither agree nor disagree  
D: agree  
E: agree strongly 
Question-4: It is difficult to get access to my local elected officer when I am in need 
(political accessibility). 
A: disagree strongly  
B: disagree  
C: neither agree nor disagree  
D: agree  
E: agree strongly 
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Question-5: It is tough for me to get police services if I am in trouble (public service 
accessibility). 
A: disagree strongly  
B: disagree  
C: neither agree nor disagree  
D: agree  
E: agree strongly 
Question-6: My friend who has political affiliation gets better treatment in the public 
hospital (health care accessibility). 
A: disagree strongly  
B: disagree  
C: neither agree nor disagree  
D: agree  
E: agree strongly 
Question-7: My colleagues receive more appreciation than me in my workplace 
(personal sense of appreciation). 
A: disagree strongly  
B: disagree  
C: neither agree nor disagree  
D: agree  
E: agree strongly 
Question-8: My colleagues are well off because they are affiliated with a political 
party (sense of political affiliation and income). 
A: disagree strongly  
B: disagree  
41 
 
C: neither agree nor disagree  
D: agree  
E: agree strongly 
The eight questions above are proposed because the majority of the questions will 
provide more information about how respondents are deprived in various aspects of their 
lives. Some of the proposed questions have been derived from the scholarly contribution of 
Kim, Callan, Gheorghiu, and Matthews (2016). For example, the first question asks 
respondents about their personal relative deprivation: “I feel deprived when I think about 
what I have compared to what other people like me have.” Here the question has five 
different options (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), and higher values indicate 
greater personal relative deprivation. The second question is about personal sense of power 
which is also calculated by the same five options scale. The third question is straight forward 
to understand how respondents feel deprived in materialistic terms. The fourth, fifth and sixth 
questions are designed to ask respondents about their perceived deprivation in getting 
political help and public services like health care, and police services. The last two questions 
are designed to quantify participants‟ sense of deprivation in appreciation and economic 
terms.  
Section 3 is the most important of all three sections. The common problem with each 
of the vignette questions regards the internalization of the story. The point here is unless the 
vignettes relate to the respondent‟s own life; they will not be sufficiently powerful to make 
the respondent feel invested in them enough to produce an honest answer. While making 
more personalistic vignettes may ease the comprehension process for the respondents, this 
approach can lead to an unbalanced vignette which can undermine the main purpose of the 
research. This study has some observations on the vignettes borrowed from Haque (2019): 
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Vignette 1: The goal of this vignette is to disguise the political party's name but to 
prime the respondents about a series of events that happened during the specified period of 
2005 to 2015. The problem here is that people can remember who was in government 
between 2005 and 2015. Therefore even if the survey maker masks the name of any specific 
political party, the respondent can easily trace whom the surveyor is trying to suggest based 
on those years. Moreover, asking general questions may be problematic especially when the 
majority of respondents have little or no education. For those kinds of respondents, it will be 
difficult to comprehend the vignette as well as to relate the presented scenarios. It may also 
be too biased to make the vignette more personalistic because it may result in an unbalanced 
prompt presentation or may invite more private information that the research shall purposely 
avoid. Moreover, the original set of vignettes includes a simple scale which cannot measure 
how relative deprivation causes people to condone political violence. Sometimes a space to 
describe things along with the simple numeric response can bring some new dimensions to 
understand the mechanism. The bottom line here is to figure out if the vignette accurately 
represents whether people condone violent events when they see relative deprivation. Based 
on those concerning issues, this study proposes the following improvements: 
Imagine a situation where a supporter of the opposition party "X" had land which is 
the primary source of income for his family. At some point, the land is illegally taken over by 
one of the supporters of the incumbent political party "Y". As a result, the evicted man goes 
to the police station to file a case but he is denied any victim support. Being angry, a group of 
“X” party supporters has beaten up the perpetrator who has illegally held the land. At that 
time, the supporter of “Y” goes to the police station to file a case against those who have 
perpetrated the violence and the police have responded by positively filing a charge sheet. 
Within the next couple of days, all of the perpetrators are arrested and imprisoned for at least 
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three years. How would one justify the violence done by the group when they are denied 
victim support? Why would one think that those acts were just or unjust? 
Vignette-2: At first glance it may appear easier in this vignette to ask people how they 
would react toward relative deprivation and to what extent the event has motivated them to 
condone violence. The outcome after deconstruction may be unacceptable as the minute 
detail questions may stand out and lead the quality of the responses. For example, the original 
vignette can be deconstructed into different small questions such as: (I) do you have any 
history of illness in your life? (II) If yes, then what kind of illness you have? (III) Are you 
able to treat your illness in private medical centers? (IV) If not have you ever face any 
difficulty getting treatment at a government hospital (why or why not)? (V) If yes, then what 
kind of difficulties have you been faced with in those hospitals? (VI) Do you feel these 
difficulties are somehow related to your political ideology? (VII) Do you think people who 
support the incumbent government are getting better treatment? (VIII) If yes, then do you 
think hospital administration and staff are involved in discriminating against people of a 
different ideology? (IX) If yes, then do you think people who are deprived of their rights to 
get access to the hospital should have the legitimacy to punish the administration and the staff 
of the public hospital? (X) Do you believe in your existing judicial system to bring justice? If 
not, then do you agree that when you get deprived of your rights, you feel vindictive towards 
those who have deprived you?  
So far the best way to ask people about deprivation and support for violence is to 
present the original vignette and then to ask them the following questions: (I) Are you able to 
see that one of the patients is relatively deprived? (II) Do you think the violent event driven 
by deprivation is right/wrong? Explain why or why not.  
Vignette 3: This vignette uses a specific year but there should not be any specific 
electoral cues because that can make people feel that they will be traced based on their 
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political ideology in the given years. On top of that, the scale needs to be replaced by a set of 
open-ended questions such as: (I) Do you think one of the farmers is relatively deprived? (II) 
Do you think the violent event done by the deprived is right or wrong? Why do you believe 
that?  
Vignette 4: This vignette is well crafted but the problem is three characters can make 
it difficult for respondents to determine how to judge what the police and judiciary have done 
to the perpetrator. The respondents may misconstrue the question because of the lack of detail 
in the explanation. The vignette needs to explain how far the verdict strays away from 
standard criminal law. It should also explain how money and power played an important role 
to manipulate the verdict. The majority of respondents have not received formal education so 
it will be difficult for them to differentiate that reciprocal violence is not an act of justice, but 
rather a digression from the standard judicial decision. On top of that, this vignette is required 
to explain that direct involvement in any rape case will result in capital punishment, so when 
a perpetrator gets 2 years of imprisonment instead of capital punishment it is a clear 
digression of justice coming from the use of money or power. The bottom line is the 
respondents need to know that, neither reciprocating violence nor a mere two years 
imprisonment complies with the standard judicial decision even though the political system 
of the case country promotes revenge violence. In this case, there can be some question at the 
end of the vignette as: (I) Are you able to see there is a systematic deprivation in terms of 
justice? (II) Do you think a person who has raped and killed someone deserves to be killed 
without following the judicial process? The background information is important to let 
respondent understand the whole situation before they mark on the scale whether they 
support the reciprocation of violence or not.   
Vignette 5: This vignette directly asked the respondent whether they support violence 
which may potentially result in negation. The question needs to be more individualistic, for 
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example: think about a place one works for 18 months where one was just paid for 6 months 
of work and the job provider says they cannot pay the remaining balance. On top of that, one 
was fired, along with 200 others like oneself. The employer is not paying because of losses 
but because of a personal craving to accumulate wealth through depriving the labour class. 
The employer has piled up money, property and power which make one frustrated. For 
example, within the last year, the employer has bought 5 luxury cars and 8 luxury mansions 
in the heartland of the country. On top of that, the Bangladesh Anti-Corruption Commission 
including the customs regulatory authority has charged him for illegal transfer of money into 
different Swiss banks. One‟s union leaders have filed a police case against the employer but 
the local police station refuses to take action against him. In this situation, if one is fired and 
refuses to pay due bills, would oneself or one‟s colleagues like the opportunity to punish 
him? People started demonstrating in front of the office chanting "we want justice". The 
employer is at the office but his luxury car has been parked outside of the office. There is an 
immense pressure from the employee so the employer calls the police to help him. When the 
police batter the angry employees, they become frustrated and set fire to the parked car of 
their employer. Do you think what the employer has done to his employees and what the 
employees have done to their employer is proper? If yes, then explain why. 
The bottom line is strategic attempts are required when it comes to collecting data on 
the attitudes towards violence. Several underlying challenges make it difficult for respondents 
as well as researchers to accumulate conclusive evidence for research. For this survey, one 
problem is limiting the response options by a numerical scale. Here respondents might have 
different explanations for why they chose to respond to a particular number of the scale and 
the number may be the same for several other respondents but their explanation for the same 
number may be different. Another underlying challenge is most of the questions ask 
respondents how they would react/valuate certain kinds of violent events. While each 
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vignette needs to have two important questions: (I) “Do the respondents see that someone in 
the vignette was relatively deprived?” And (II) “Do they believe the violent event perpetrated 
by the discriminated individual is right? Explain why or why not.” It is important to 
understand both questions so that respondents can draw their own conclusions on the 
connection between relative deprivation and attitudes towards violence.  
Challenges of Conducting an Open-End Interview  
Based on the suggested changes an open-end interview might help harvest the most 
nuance from the questions. But there are some challenges in conducting open-end interviews:  
an open-end interview method will require (i) professional research assistant(s), (ii) research 
training, (iii) conveyance and accommodation fees and (iv) technical and logistics support. 
Considering all these obligations to re-conduct 150 open-end interviews, a big budget is 
required. If this study employs two research assistants and they conduct two interviews a day 
then it will take 6-7 weeks. Then if those assistants transcribe five interviews a day they will 
be able to finish transcribing the interviews in 2 weeks. As a result, the whole process will 
take 9-10 weeks altogether. An open-ended interview approach needs experienced and 
professional field researcher(s). As this method is not limited to the "yes" or "no" answer 
options, it needs to collect comprehensive answers with maximum possible nuance related to 
the research questions. As a result, this study needs to have experienced field researchers who 
have professional skills and technical capacities to draw out detailed responses from the 
interviewees. On top of that, the researchers also need to have training on research ethics and 
compliance because without training and knowledge on the specific issue, the quality of the 
data collection may be affected. Another important logistical requirement for the project is to 
have a meeting room for the interview. As the proposed questionnaire suggests having in-




To sum up, this study needs time, a bigger budget, experienced researchers, and some 
logistical support to collect empirical evidence from the selected case country. But the 
problem is this project is undertaken for a master‟s degree which has limited time with 
restricted financial support. If there is a bit more time to conduct some pilot in-depth 
interviews based on the suggested changes, constructive outcomes are expected. 
Recommendations for the Future Research 
Based on the number of violent events observed it is conclusive that political violence 
is prevalent in the case country. But the question is: does relative deprivation lead people to 
condone political violence? If the conclusion were drawn based on the survey data which has 
been utilized in this study, then the answer is no. However, there are some underlying causes 
of political violence which should be considered for future research such as: 
Micro-level Analysis of Violence: Any future research may consider looking into the 
micro-level analysis of violence based on resource distribution and power utilization. For 
instance, micro-level violent events happen based on issues like religious practices, access to 
natural resources like rivers, canals or unclaimed land, and getting government tenders 
(Moniruzzaman, 2009). The above-mentioned issues sometimes provoke people in such a 
way that they participate in violent events. For instance, the majority of people in Bangladesh 
are Muslim and there are two major factions of Islam widely practiced in that country. Often 
people engage in violent conflict based on the differences of practicing religion and in some 
cases, that violence surpasses the individual and extends to the village level. These micro-
level violent events could provide insight for the condoning of violent events. The 
relationship between perceived deprivation and attitudes toward condoning political violence 
may require complements to identify the latent attitudes towards violence. As the majority of 
the people in Bangladesh are Muslim, new research can lead the deprivation survey by 
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asking: “Do they feel deprived when practicing Islam and do they feel vindictive when other 
religious factions impose their thoughts on them?” 
Mix Method: Any future research on political violence should strongly consider 
undertaking a qualitative approach. Quantitative analyses may be easier to calculate and 
decide on a given hypothesis, but sensitive issues like political violence benefit from the 
qualitative approach, which more easily reveals the underlying factors to supporting and 
denying political violence. It is more appropriate if both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches are undertaken. Furthermore, the survey of this research has limited the response 
by putting scale for the output which is again easy to calculate but there may be some nuance 
missed due to utilizing close-ended questions. In this regard, presence of both close-ended 
and open-ended questionnaires may yield some important details which can be utilized for 
better comprehension. 
Conclusion 
This research was initiated to understand how relative deprivation causes people to 
condone political violence assuming that greater deprivation yields a stronger tendency to 
condone political violence while lesser deprivation garners a lower tendency to condone 
political violence. But testing the dataset fails to achieve sufficient support for the hypothesis. 
Based on the empirical data, the relationship between relative deprivation and condoning 
political violence is inconclusive. However, the study reveals several limitations which may 
guide future research to addressing the challenges found here. This study speculates that 
limited research observations, the arguable foundation of the core theory, and the quantitative 
nature of the study, as well as the ability of the survey maker to deal with a sensitive issue 
may have impacted the overall result of the study.   
 Therefore, this study suggests that any future research within the field consider 
a mixed-method (quantitative and qualitative) for field investigation. Additionally, it is 
49 
 
recommended that the survey questionnaire follow an open-ended method to collect the 
maximum nuance from the respondents. Individual response collection should be 






THE ORIGINAL RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
Section-1; General Information:  
01. Interview Date: __ __ __ __ ____ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
02. S. No. Interview: __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ___ __ __ __ __ 
03. Date of Birth/Age: __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ___ __ __ __ 
04. Post Office/Code__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ___ __ __ __ __ 
05. District: __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
06. Gender: __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ___ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
07. Person conducting interview: __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
Section-2; Socio-Economic Status: 
1- How often does the power go out in your house? 
A: More than once a week 
B: Once in a month 
C: Once a week 
D: Once every two weeks  
2- How much, on average, do you spend on your mobile phone bill per month? 
A: do not own a cell phone 
B: between 0 and 25$ 
C: between 26$ and 100$ 
D: over 100$ 
3- How many people do you share a bedroom with? 
A: do not share 
B: one more person 
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C: two more people 
D: over 3 
4-How many places did you visit for recreational purposes (at least 100 kilometers 
away from home) in the last 12 months? 
A: no visits 
B: once 
C: two to four times 
D: five times or more 
5-How many times have you eaten mutton or lobster in the past week? 
A: have not had any in the past week 
B: once 
C: two to four time 
D: five times or more 
6-Has your neighbor, or someone you know, asked to borrow food from your 
household in the past week? 
A: no one asked 
B: once 
C: two to four times 
D: five times or more 
7-How much time of your day is spent on public transportation in order to get to 
work? 
A: less than twenty minutes 
B: between twenty minutes and an hour 
C: between an hour and two hours 
D: over two hours 
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8-Think back to the last time you were seen in a private hospital. Please compare that 
experience to your experience in a public hospital. 
A: Experience in private hospital was better 
B: Experience in public hospital was better 
C: Have never been to a private hospital 
D: Have never been to a public hospital 
E: Have never been to either public or private hospital 




C: More than once 
D: Often 
Section-3; Vignette Questions 
 1) Imagine a situation when a supporter of a political party "XYZ" was beaten up by 
some supporters of an incumbent political party "ABC" in 2005 and the victim went to the 
police station to file a case against the supporter of ABC but denied any victim support. Now 
think about a supporter of ABC in 2015 who was beaten up by some supporters of incumbent 
XYZ and the victim went to the same police station but denied to have support. How would 
react on what the police station do to the victims?  
a) Support strongly  
b) Support to some extent  
c) Neither support nor contradict  
d) Contradict to some extent  
e) Contradict absolutely 
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2) Now think about a situation where a supporter of the opposition political party, as 
well as a supporter of the incumbent political party, got the same level of heart disease (for 
example 79% heart blockage) and both of the patients admitted into the same government-
sponsored hospital. As of the rule, the hospital authority is required to offer first come first 
serve facility. But the patient who was supporting the opposition political party was denied a 
standard bed rather was offered a floor with limited medical facilities. However, the other 
patient who was the supporter incumbent political party was offered a standard bed with 
required medical facilities. Being angry with the situation the family members of the 
victimized patient beaten up some hospital staff and doctors. In that situation how would you 
react to the activity done by the relatives of the discriminated patient? 
a) Support strongly  
b) Support to some extent  
c) Neither support nor contradict  
d) Contradict to some extent  
e) Contradict absolutely 
3) Again think about a situation where a farmer who had supported the opposition 
political party in the 2008 election was denied to have government-subsidized fertilizer and 
irrigation water whereas a farmer who had supported the incumbent political party was 
offered subsidized fertilizer and irrigation. Now in that condition, if the incumbent supporter 
yields a huge amount of crops whereas the opposite supporter got nothing. If the victim set 
fire on the wining farmer how would you react on that? 
a) Support strongly  
b) Support to some extent  
c) Neither support nor contradict  
d) Contradict to some extent  
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e) Contradict absolutely 
4) Last year a group of three incumbent supporters raped and killed a woman. Among 
the three rapist-killers, one of them was a son of an influencing businessman, other was a son 
of a member of the parliament (MP) and the last one was a local drug smuggler. During a 
trial of the case, police killed the drug smuggler in crossfire and thereafter the court sentenced 
the other two perpetrators with 2 years of imprisonment and charged $1200 compensation 
money. What do you think about the verdict of the court and activity of the police? 
a) Support strongly  
b) Support to some extent  
c) Neither support nor contradict  
d) Contradict to some extent  
e) Contradict absolutely 
5) Think about a situation where a local industrialist owned a garment factory where 
2200 people work. That industrialist loaned 100 million of BDT to a nationalized bank. As he 
was facing recurring losses in his business. On top of that, he owed one year salary of his 
2200 workers. At that time, he made a plan to flee from Bangladesh with the help of the 
incumbent political party leader. Somehow the worker's union leaders came to know his plan 
and asked all 2200 workers to punish him. So when he refused the workers to pay their 
salary, all 2200 workers slapped and kicked him until his death. How would you evaluate 
what the workers did to their employer? 
a) Support strongly  
b) Support to some extent  
c) Neither support nor contradict  
d) Contradict to some extent  




RATIONALE OF THE SURVEY 
Section-2 of the Survey  
The field study is concerned that there could be some people in the survey population 
who had never felt deprived of their need in the public sector because they can afford a 
private hospital, schools and economic opportunities. So the section-2 questions will help the 
investigator to determine the social and economic statuses of the participant. It is expected 
that those simple but powerful questions will simplify the process to analyze the relationship 
between deprivation and tendency to condone.  
Section-3 of the Survey 
Vignette-1: To hammer on the thought process of the research participants, this 
vignette has added two specific periods. The reason is in 2005 there was government led by 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) which has different political and ideological goals than 
the 2015's political party Bangladesh Awami League (BAL). The main purpose of this 
vignette is to ask a balanced question to find out attitudes of the participants when access to 
justice comes against and in favour of their preferred political party. The mechanism here is, 
if the respondents support the denial of access to justice for the supporter of their opposite 
political ideologue then it can be concluded that the respondent will condone violence 
perpetrated against their opposition. The plot of this vignette was drawn from Human Rights 
Watch reports published in 2018. 
Vignette-2: the second vignette is designed to understand how people are politically 
sensitive on basic issues like health care. The survey maker wants to see whether people 
condone violence even if there are ways to avoid it. This vignette presents a situation when 
the contending political parties‟ decision was wrong and the survey maker wants to see how 
respondents justify the activity. If the respondents appreciate what has been done to the 
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healthcare provider then it is conclusive that the respondent will condone political violence. 
The actual scenario is compiled from the event happening every day in Bangladesh. 
Government hospitals have limited seats as because these are offered at literally free of cost. 
For example Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) government is in power now so if some 
political supporter of BAL gets sick they could easily get hospitalized at free of cost while if 
any supporter of leader of the opposition party gets sick then they might have been 
hospitalized at free of cost if there is plenty of seats available. Distribution of seats in the 
hospital is not first come first serve basis, this is based on political affiliation and linkage 
with the leader in power. 
Vignette-3: this vignette is designed to delegate a situation where both parties are 
victimized by each other. Government is responsible to offer subsidized fertilizer equally and 
fairly to the farmers. But often time it is observed that party in power become bias to 
distribute fertilizer among their supporters. For example, Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) 
is in power now so the government defined distribution channel will put a bracket for those 
who are no BAL supporter. The survey maker targets to look into the outcome on how 
participants react on each injustice happened among them. Both of these parties did wrong 
but the point is to understand how respondents condone the perpetration of political violence.  
Vignette-4: this vignette is a bit different from the other vignette because the other 
vignette presents two contending political parties‟ activity but this vignette presents only one. 
In this vignette, we wanted to see how people expose their attitudes towards a judicial crisis. 
Because the survey maker wants to know how people relate violence in general, do they 
condone violence all the time or they stand against when there is a judicial crisis. In 2018 and 
2019 there had been two murder cases which Awami League government had intentionally 
put a rug on the issue because the driver of those murder and rape case was the big shot 
political leader of Awami League government.  
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Vignette-5: While the other vignettes are designed to understand tendency to condone 
violence at individual level this vignette is designed to understand collective tendency. Mob 
lynching is a frequent violent event in Bangladesh. This vignette specifically targets to 
calculate the attitude of respondent when they see rightful labor movement turning into a 
violent event.  Playing with the political economy in Bangladesh is just a matter of daily 
affairs. The big shot businessmen who use to invest during the election campaign once their 
party comes in power they start pulling out their investment with a huge amount of interest. 
Those businessmen have big hand over government decision and the policy the government 
takes. Having control over the political system, businesses want to make substandard pay-
scale for their workers. They also enjoy a big amount of loans from the government bank and 






Vignette response code: the vignettes are designed to measure how people support or 
condemn certain kind of violence. The range starts from 0 to 10 scales, where 0 means the 
most condemnation and 10 mean the most support offered by the respondent. Here the range 
between 0-1 means the respondent is absolutely condemning the violence, from 2-3 it means 
condemning to some extent, 4-5 means neither support nor condemn, 6-7 means support to 
some extent and lastly 8-10 it means the respondent support strongly.  
01. Intd- Interview date 
02. InNo- Interview number, skip it if unknown 
03. InPpl- Interviewer's name, skip if unknown 
04. Ag- What is your approximate age? 
05. BPlace- What is your birthplace (district's name)? 
06. PCode- What is the post code of your place of birth?(please skip if forgotten) 
07. PStn- Which Police Station your birthplace belongs to? 
08. Edu- What is the highest level of education you received? 
I. Ascribed values: 12-undergrad= 16 
II. 6th to 8th Standard= 8 
III. 9th to 10th Standard= 10 
IV. Didn't receive any schooling= 0 
V. 1st to 5th Standard= 5 
VI. Graduate to beyond= 18 
VII. 10th to 12th Standard=12 
09. HPwr- How often does the power go out in your house? 
Ascribed values:  
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I. More than once a week= 8 
II. Once in a month= 1 
III. Once a week= 4 
IV. Once every two weeks= 2 
10. PBill- How much, on average, do you spend on your mobile phone bill per month? 
Ascribed values:  
I. Over 300-400bdt 
II. Between 100 to 300- 200 
III. Do not own a cell phone-0 
IV. Between 0 and 100 BDT-100 
11. HShare- How many people share your residence? 
I. Ascribed values: Do not share-1 
II. One more person-2 
III. Two more people-3 
12. PlsVst- How many places did you visit for recreational purposes (at least 100 
kilometers away from home) in the last 12 months? 
Ascribed value:  
I. Two to four times-4 
II. No visits-0 
III. Once-1 
13. ExoFood- How many times have you eaten mutton or lobster in the past week? 
Ascribed values:  
I. Have not had any in the past week-0 
II. Two to four time-4 
III. Five times or more-6 
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14. BrwNgbr- Has your neighbor, or someone you know, asked to borrow food (for 
example: sugar, rice, milk and/or potato) from your household in the past week?) 
Ascribed values:  
I. One come once-1 
II. No one asked- 0 
III. Two to four time-4 
IV. Five times or more-6 
15. Transp- How much time do you spend on local public transportation in order to get to 
work from home? 
Ascribed values:  
I. Between an hour and two hours-2 
II. Less than twenty minutes -0.5 
III. I don't use any local transportation-0 
IV. Over two hours- 3 
16. PvtHspt- Think back to the last time you were seen in a private hospital. Please 
compare that experience to your experience in a public hospital. 
Values set:  
I. Experience in private hospital was better-3 
II. Experience in public hospital was better-2 
III. Have never been to either public or private hospital-0 
IV. Have never been to a public hospital-0 
V. Experience in the public and private hospital is the same-1 
17. AppHelp- Have you, or someone you know, approached a politician/ leader or elected 




II. More than five times-6 
III. Two to four time-4 
IV. Five times or more-6 
18. v1PoliceAct: vignette on access to police station 
19. v2Treatment: access to hospitalization  
20. v3Subsidy: violence for subsidy 
21. v4Justice: violence for access to justice 
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